In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain philosophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an issue of behavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanistically, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts common in the behavioral community share some of the dangers of mentalism ifnot employed properly, including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules.
Criticism of a behavioral approach to human behavior has been frequent since its inception. Recently, a type ofcriticism has emerged from knowledgeable critics suggesting that there is a more rapid path to the kinds ofscientific knowledge sought by behaviorists (e.g., Keat, 1972; Wessells, 1981 Wessells, , 1982 . Even individuals who formerly have been sympathetic to a behavior-analytic position have embraced this line of criticism. For example, Kil- leen has suggested that we need to "restore the excitement" in our field by admitting mentalism (Killeen, 1984) .
Behavorists would enthusiastically embrace this suggestion if the alternatives being proposed (e.g., Killeen's "emergent behaviorism," 1984) advanced the goals of science as seen by behavior analysts. Sadly, that possibility does not appear likely. Instead, the critics seem to be proposing a kind of science that is ill-suited to the scientific ends sought by behavior analysts. Although the criticisms may seem to be about scientific strategies or tactics, in actuality they concern the behavior-analytic view of scientific explanation itself.
The nature of the recent criticism suggests that it may be worthwhile to reexRequests for reprints may be sent to Steven C. Hayes, Department of Psychology, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, NV 89557-0062. This paper is published in loving memory of Aaron J. Brownstein ). We will miss you, old friend. amine some of the philosophical underpinnings of a behavior-analytic view of science. Many of the points we hope to make have been made elsewhere, but the discussions have often been directed toward other specific concerns and have not always been interconnected or given a comprehensive rationale. Keystones of a behavior-analytic position can then appear to be dogmatic or arbitrary, rather than required for the intellectual integrity of the position.
Our starting point will be the primary purposes of science from a behavior-analytic viewpoint-prediction and control. We will attempt to show that an emphasis on prediction and control is not arbitrary in behavior analysis because it is a necessary part of successful forms of the philosophy that underlies behavioranalytic theorizing. We will examine mentalism from several vantage points and show that regardless of its form, mentalism is necessarily counterproductive to the purposes of science embraced by behavior analysts. Mentalism can, however, contribute to the purposes of science as seen from other perspectives. We will examine a behavioral translation of some types of mental phenomena in terms of behavior-behavior relations, but warn against uses of the translation that also interfere with the accomplishment of prediction and control. We will then briefly examine several concepts within a behavioral perspective that are on a slippery slope to the same problem created by mentalism.
THE PURPOSES OF SCIENCE: PREDICTION AND CONTROL When differences in goals are made evident, many arguments seem to dissolve. The goals of science from a behavioranalytic viewpoint have been quite explicitly stated: "We undertake to predict and control the behavior of the individual organism. This is our 'dependent variable'-the effect for which we are to find the cause" (Skinner, 1953, p. 35) . It seems only fair to evaluate a position with respect to the goals it sets for itself, while recognizing ofcourse that other purposes might be well served by different positions.
The Emphasis on Control
Prediction and control are the primary goals of behavior analysis (the goals of interpretation and explanation are discussed later). The behavioral approach places emphasis on the words "and control" in the phrase "prediction and control." Behavior analysis has sought an explanation ofbehavior in terms ofevents that are ofa kind that at least potentially allows both prediction and control simultaneously. As we discuss below, some kinds of descriptions of events and relations can in principle only directly produce successful prediction and not control. Other kinds ofdescriptions ofevents and relations can allow both, in principle, though of course for practical reasons control may presently be impossible. Behavior analysis is committed to emphasizing this latter kind of analysis.
The importance ofprediction and control as a guide to behavior-analytic theorizing cannot be overemphasized. It is the key to understanding many behavioral positions that might otherwise appear to be arbitrary. For example, behavior-analytic accounts of behavior are always ultimately to be cast in terms of "environmental variables" or "external variables": "Our 'independent variables'-the causes of behavior-are the external conditions of which behavior is a function" (Skinner, 1953, p. 35 ). This position is not based on an a priori dictum that only what are commonly called "external variables" can possibly influence behavior. In a sense, the flow is in the opposite direction. If an event can in principle directly allow both prediction and control of behavior, then it deserves the name "environmental variable" or "external variable." This relation can be shown by the fact that, in behavior analysis, the words "external" or "environmental" do not always refer to the world outside the skin: rather they refer to the world outside behavior (most of which, of course, is outside the skin). For example, it is sometimes useful ("useful" in terms of prediction and control) to think of an "internal environment" influencing behavior.
An emphasis on "external variables" comes from the goals ofscience as viewed by behavior analysis. Seeking both prediction and control puts certain constraints on the kinds of statements of relations that are useful for the scientist. Only statements that point to events external to the behavior of the individual organism being studied can directly lead to prediction and control. Wessells (198 1) objects to an emphasis on control, saying "the kinds ofpredictions one aims to make need not be dictated by the pragmatic desire to change behavior for the better" (p. 161). The concern over control, however, is not primarily with the development of technology, though the technological outgrowth of behavior analysis is impressive and a legitimate source of intellectual support for the position. At a theoretical level, the concern is primarily with the completeness ofthe account according to the scientific goals embraced by behavior analysis. A behavior-analytic position on the goals of science in turn derives its dignity from the necessary relation between these particular goals and the overall philosophical integrity of the world view represented by behavior analysis (cf. Reese, 1984) .
Behavior analysis is based on a pervasive use of a particular explanatory model: the "act in context." In behavior analysis, any event is to be understood and even defined through a contextual analysis. The three-term contingency of radical behaviorism is a dynamic spatiotemporal contextual unit-none of the terms can be defined independently of any of the others. Radical behaviorism is so thoroughgoing in its attempt to analyze context that even the behavior of scientists as they conduct contextual analyses is to be understood through more contextual analyses (Skinner, 1945) .
The explanatory model of the "act in context" is shared by many perspectives on behavior, from certain forms of evolutionary biology (e.g., Dawkins, 1982) , to some types of cultural anthropology (e.g., Harris, 1979) , to Marxism. Because a basic explanatory model (or "root metaphor") is at the core of any well-integrated and consistent world view, Pepper (1942) has suggested that all perspectives that rely on the "act in context" as an explanatory model be thought ofas types of the world view he calls "contextualism." According to Pepper (1942) , the underlying "truth criterion" of contextualism is "successful working" or pragmatism (Pepper, 1942) . A term, concept, or statement of a relation is not true or false simply according to public agreement about the correspondence between it and other events, but according to the impact that the use of the term, concept, or statement has on dealing successfully with the phenomena of interest. Radical behaviorism clearly encompasses such a view (e.g., Skinner, 1945 (Martin, 1978; Wessells, 1981) because we cannot test astronomical principles based on our ability to control cosmic events. The literal meaning ofexplanation comes from the same root as the word "plane" -literally, explanation means to lay out flat before us. According to the behavior-analytic position, "explanation" ultimately refers to prediction and control with adequate scope and precision. Thus, seen from the standpoint of behavior analysis, Wessell's statement is at least partially incorrect. We cannot have control in a sophisticated manner without what behaviorists take to be "explanation." With thorough and general control must also come prediction, and to a behaviorist, prediction and control of sufficient scope and precision is "explanation" -it is how behaviorists "lay out" behavioral systems. Control that is limited in scope and precision does not, of course, justify the term "explanation" and in that sense Wessell's observation seems obviously valid. The observation that pointing a gun at people and saying "Your money or your life" will often control monetary exchange is hardly an explanation ofcharitable giving. Such coercion fails as an explanation for monetary contributions in general because it has insufficient scope: a wide variety of instances are not encompassed by the "explanation."
Behavior analysts also agree that at times science can have explanation without control. Skinner uses the term "interpretation" to describe such cases. It occurs when a system can be thoroughly described, but for technical reasons control is not possible. Even 
The Mechanistic View ofExplanation
This view of explanation can be contrasted with others that are popular in psychology. To put the best face on it from the point of view of behavior analysis, some forms of cognitivism are usefully considered as efforts to describe the structure of behavior (Catania, 1973) . A description of the structure of behavior, however, is a description ofthe phenomena to be explained. Knowing the phenomena to be explained is vital, but it must not be mistaken for a contextual explanation of these very phenomena. The distinction is critical because if behavioral events are orderly, they themselves can allow prediction ofbehavioral phenomena, without ever going outside the particular behavioral system. This is not adequate behavior analytic explanation even though in a more limited sense it clearly can be useful. No amount of description of behavioral events will directly provide for control ofbehavioral events in the same individual. To think otherwise is to make the "structuralist error" (Skinner, 1974 Most, though not all, forms of a cognitive account of behavior seem to be based on the world view of mechanism (cf. Pepper, 1942) . The fundamental explanatory model of mechanism is that of the machine. The type of cognitive theorizing that is based on computer metaphors and uses computer simulations to test the adequacy and operating characteristics of various theoretical models is obviously mechanistic in this sense. We will limit our discussion of cognitivism to this mechanistic variety. (Some forms ofbehaviorism are also mechanistic, but not radical behaviorism. A detailed discussion ofthis is beyond the scope ofthis paper, but see Hayes & Reese, in press.) In accord with its explanatory model, a mechanist shows no hesitation in explaining a behavioral system by specifying the component parts ofits structure and the nature of its orderly operation; just as a person examining a car would readily explain its action by an appeal to its component parts (e.g., pistons, spark plugs) and structural organization (e.g., the spark plug wire is connected to the spark plug). In mechanism, each part can be described independently of the others and the nature ofthe parts does not change when they are combined into systems. The conditions that gave rise to this structure or the ways we can manipulate it are irrelevant to the description of the operation ofthe machine and predictions based on this description.
Mechanism has a correspondencebased truth criterion (Pepper, 1942 Originally, psychology was the study of the soul. The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines "soul" as "the spiritual part of man." The OED defines "spirit" as an "incorporeal or immaterial being" and as a "being or intelligence distinct from anything physical." The word "physical" comes from a word for nature (thus the science of physics) and is defined as "of or pertaining to the phenomenal world of the senses; matter." Thus, if you take the words literally, "soul" or "spirit" are inherently dualistic terms because they oppose matter and nonmatter. We might label this "literal dualism." Literal dualism is the beliefthat there are two different essences in the world-one type exists in space and time, while the second type is nonspatiotemporal.
This type ofliteral dualism was to some degree transferred to the concept of "mind" and thus to its study. The OED defines "mind" as "the mental or psychical being or faculty." An elaborating definition explains that "mind" is "the seat of a person's consciousness, thoughts, volitions, and feelings; also, the incorporeal subject of the psychical faculties, the spiritual side of a human being; the soul as distinguished from the body .... Mental being; opposed to matter." The spiritual meaning of"mind" is also shown by the fact that God has long been referred to as "mind," as for example in the quote "That eternal infinite mind, who made and governs all things" (Locke, 1690 world (or at least the 'one' world)" (Skinner, 1945, p. 276, emphasis added). As the last phrase in this quote shows, radical behaviorism is monistic, but not physicalistic in the sense ofnaive realism or related perspectives.
The second major objection to literal dualism is that it leaves a gap in the domain of science. Who is to predict and control mental events and relate them to behavioral events if they are not in the purview of science? (Skinner, 1953, p. 258 ). This objection is a metatheoretical one, and it applies equally forcefully to mentalistic theorizing that explicitly denies dualism.
Mental Physiology
For the above reasons, virtually all scientists avoid obvious forms of literal dualism in their scientific work. A variety oflinguistic practices, however, have the same metatheoretical problems as literal dualism. One such practice is the creation of a pseudophysiological analysis to replaced literal dualism (Skinner, 1969, pp. 280-284) .
It is very popular to use the word "mind" to mean "brain. Of course, brain activity can be studied physiologically, but cognitive psychologists use a different approach. Since the brain activity ofinterest cannot be directly observed (for example, we have no idea what happens in the brain when a person remembers a grandmother), we must infer the existence of these processes and then describe the processes in abstract language. (Ellis & Hunt, 1983, p. 7) In summary, mental activity can be thought of as nonspatiotemporal activity, in which case it steps outside of science altogether. It may be thought of as a brain activity, but then psychologists sometimes act as if we need not explain how the structure of this activity itself came to be. There is a third way to view "mental activity," however-as behavior.This is the view taken by radical behaviorism, to which we now turn.
Mental Activity as Private Behavior
Watson and "behavior." "Behavior" is commonly taken to refer to a certain subset of organismic action. For example, it is quite typical to hear theorists speak of "thoughts, feelings, and behavior" as if behavior can be easily distinguished from events called "thoughts" or "feelings."
Confusion over this issue can in part be attributed to Watson. Watson's (1925) behaviorism had both methodological and metaphysical components. His methodological behaviorism essentially said that scientists must be behaviorists because science can only deal with the publicly observable. Thus, even though other kinds of human action may exist, we can only deal with behavior because only behavior is publicly observable. This position might be thought ofas implicitly dualistic because it recognizes that behavior is only a subset of organismic activity, and encourages a study that is necessarily incomplete since science can only deal with that subset, rather than the entire set, due to rules of proper scientific methodology.
Watson also made a second, somewhat contradictory point. He seemed to say that even if we could solve the problem privacy presents to a scientific analysis, behavior is still all that could be studied because only behavior exists. Although it is possible to read Watson to mean simply that nonspatiotemporal events do not exist, his emphasis on the peripheral locus ofsuch phenomena as thinking (e.g., Watson, 1920 Watson, , 1925 can be and was taken to mean that thoughts, feelings, and other private events are not real in their own terms. This position can be termed "Watsonian metaphysical behaviorism."
What is important to note in all ofthis is that the use of the word "behavior" keeps changing. In Watsonian methodological behaviorism, behavior is viewed as a subset of organismic action that is publicly observable and is therefore subject to a scientific analysis. In Watsonian metaphysical behaviorism, behavior is viewed as the totality of organismic ac-tion, but there is the implication that only events that are publicly observable (at least potentially) should be thought of as real.
Radical behaviorism and "behavior."
Radical behaviorism can be distinguished from these other types of behaviorism in part by the view it takes in regards to "behavior" and the nature of scientific observations (Skinner, 1945 (Skinner, , 1963 . As in Watsonian metaphysical behaviorism, behavior is taken to be the set of all organismic action. The word "organismic" is important. Actions by suborganismic units (e.g., a single neuron firing) are not usually considered to be the behavior oforganisms, but under certain conditions they may if they can conveniently be viewed as the integrated action of a whole organism. For example, the controlled heart rate of a person in a biofeedback training program would probably be thought of as the behavior of an organism, while the beating of a heart removed from the body clearly would not.
Unlike earlier forms of behaviorism, however, radical behaviorism makes no commitment to public observability per se as the defining characteristic of scientifically valid events (Skinner, 1945) . Rather, observations are scientifically valid or invalid based on the contingencies controlling these observations. Science is an enterprise that promotes the development of verbal statements of relations between events based on verifiable experience. Scientific verbal behavior thus should be under the control of the subject matter of the science and the value of this verbal behavior is determined through the impact it has on others attempting to come under the control of that same subject matter.
Science attempts to restrict sources of control over scientific observation through the scientific method. Its purpose is to ensure that scientific observations are controlled primarily by events in the relevant subject matter and not by states ofdeprivation, audience factors, or similar sources ofcontrol over verbal behavior (Moore, 1981) . Consistent with the "successful working" truth criterion of contextualism, the scientific value of an observation in behavior analysis is ultimately determined by the degree to which it enables prediction and control.
The essence of Skinner's (1945) criticism of operationism was thus that public agreement provides no assurance of the proper sources of control over scientific observation, nor of its pragmatic value. Conversely, in principle, observations of private events can be tightly controlled by these events themselves, given the proper history, and can be highly useful. In this sense, observations of private events are no more or less scientific than public events based on their privacy per se. In radical behaviorism, behavior can thus be defined as all observable organismic action, not all publicly observable organismic action (cf. Heidbreder, 1933 , and her discussion of the flaws ofclassical behaviorism). Skinner (1974) In this view, then, no objection can be made to talk of events such as thinking or feeling. This talk is not trivialized by insisting it is only the talk itself that is scientifically legitimate (Skinner, 1945) . A specific instance of thinking is viewed as a scientifically accessible event-a covert behavior. We may eventually find ways of identifying specific covert behaviors in others. For example, we currently have ways of knowing when reports of private speech are in fact occasioned by the specified private speech (Hayes, 1986) .
Mental Causality as Behavior-Behavior Relation Thoughts as behavior. One might ask: Why insist that thinking be regarded as covert behavior when the physical properties appear so different from overt behavior? Why not call thinking "mental activity" or even a "brain process"? If "behavior" is defined so broadly, doesn't this make the concept of "behavior" meaningless? Such questions have often been forcefully raised. For example:
The omission of [mental] states left [Skinner] with an inadequate vocabulary, which he then expanded by moving some stimuli inside the organism ("private stimuli"), and by treating all other aspects of mental states as responses. Seeing became behavior, and imagination became "seeing without the thing seen." But these are assertions, not demonstrated facts. They may serve as the axioms of a parsimonious behavioral system, and that is largely how Skinner used them. But they cannot then also be used as arguments against other systems, or against behavioral systems with augmented axioms, such as the assumption that covert events are sufficiently different from overt ones to deserve separate treatment as a separate category ofevents. (Killeen, 1984, p. 27) Skinner himself (1974) Behavior-behavior relations as incomplete accounts. By referring to "mental events" as behavior we do three things. First, we eliminate consideration of "mental events" that cannot be thought ofas observable organismic activity, such as purely hypothetical constructs. Second, we emphasize that it is the task of psychology to predict and control these events. And third, we focus on analyses that can accomplish these two goals. If "mental events" are a separate category of events, then they can be used to explain behavioral events and perhaps need not themselves be explained by behavioral scientists. Mental events that cannot be translated into behavioral observations are particularly prone to this problem because by definition they are seemingly a separate category of events from behavior. The problem can be used as an "argument against other systems," but it is not a mere repetition of axioms. It is an identification of possibly mischievous contingencies over the behavior of psychologists, one that the history of psychology gives us every reason to take seriously.
When a radical behaviorist is less than enthusiastic about an account of behavior that predicts that someone will respond in a given way after thinking a particular thought, it should be an absence of enthusiasm resulting from the incompleteness ofthe account rather than from the reference to a thought. The immediate question then becomes what are the determinants of that thought and (even less obviously) what are the contingencies that lead to a relation between a given instance of thinking and overt responding in this individual.
In behavior analysis, the view that thinking causes overt behavior distills down to the view that one behavior can cause another. In these terms, when we ask such questions as "What role does thinking play in the control of behavior?", we are actually asking about the nature of a behavior-behavior relation. Behavior-behavior relations are very important in behavior analysis in a variety of areas, and they are as worthy of study as is any behavior. No matter how dynamically one behavioral event may be intertwined with other behavioral events within the same individual, however, for a contextualist a behavior-behavior relation is a phenomenon to be explained by appealing to particular contextual arrangements (e.g., contingencies of reinforcement) that might permit prediction and control of the behavior-behavior relation itself. A behavior-behavior relation cannot be a complete explanation of behavior, except to a mechanist, whose world view does not insist on control as a necessary goal of science.
"We may object, first, to the predilection for unfinished causal sequences" (Skinner, 1969, p. 240) . Killeen (1984) has criticized this concern:
Skinner notes that after we have explained a response in terms of mental states or activities of feeling, we still need to explain the mental state. But there is nothing wrong with that. Experimental analysis of one of the links in a causal chain should not necessarily be faulted because it does not include the previous ones; analysis must inevitably stop at some point short of the Ultimate Cause." (pp. 27-28) For a complete account, however, behavior analysts must take analysis to the point at which prediction and control are directly possible in principle. Behavior ofthe individual being studied can never satisfy that criterion.
Thus, despite the fact that environment and behavior are always involved in a dynamic interrelation, it is not arbitrary (Bandura, 1978 (Bandura, , 1981 to insist that analysis proceed to the environmental level. An environmental cause can in principle be used directly; given the technical ability to manipulate it, effective action can be based on it. A rule pointing to a behavioral "cause" might help locate causal environmental events and relations, but it is also likely, if one is not careful, to stop the search for causes that could permit a complete account. Skinner (1974) has said this explicitly:
It has been objected that we must stop somewhere in following a causal chain into the past and we may as well stop at a psychic level ... It is true that we could trace human behavior not only to the physical conditions which [cause it] but also to the causes of those conditions and the causes of those causes, almost ad infinitum, but there is no point in going back beyond the point at which effective action can be taken. That point is not to be found in the psyche. (p. 210) Thus, "the initiating action is taken by the environment" (Skinner, 1974, p. 73, emphasis added; see also Skinner, 1984 Insisting that we call "mental events" by the name "behavior" should not be done to diminish the interest in these socalled mental events, any more than calling a public behavior in a behavior-behavior relation by the name "behavior" should be done to diminish interest in public behavior. Behavioral scientists should call events "behavior" to keep clear the fact that it is their job to explain such events and to avoid incomplete accounts based on these events.
A brief summary seems in order. Responses obviously usually produce stimuli. For example, all operants, by definition, do so. The concept of response-produced stimuli, however, is usually invoked when there is no possibility of discerning or manipulating the stimuli independently ofthe behavior itself. The danger is that, because stimuli are apparently in a different class than behavior, explanations based on "response-produced stimuli" will be accepted as complete even when we have in principle no hope of manipulating or even discerning these stimuli independently. Explanations are not complete under these conditions. We move no closer to prediction and control simply by replacing a behavior-behavior relation with a "behavior-response-produced stimuli-behavior" relation unless we have independent access to the stimuli. It is useless to "explain behavior by appealing to independent variables which have been inferred from the behavior thus explained" (Skinner, 1969, p. 264) . The radical behavioral objection to hypothetical constructs (when they are used as other than merely a shorthand for behavior) has the same metatheoretical basis as the primary objection to mentalism. In some cases, "response-produced stimuli" can have the status of a purely hypothetical construct.
This objection does not necessarily mean that we should stop using the term "response-produced stimuli." We should distinguish, however, between three types of situations. In the first, the "stimuli" referred to are clearly in the domain in which control is possible in principle. An ordinary operant is an example. A keypeck that produces food is producing food-related stimuli. That is presumably why this behavior occurs in the first place. We could speak of the food as responseproduced stimuli. In this case, we are using the term "response-produced stimuli" in a manner totally consistent with the goals of science as seen by behavior analysts because we can manipulate these stimuli independently from the behavior that produced them and discern their effects on behavior.
In the second situation, the stimuli cannot currently be controlled due to technical limitations, but control is possible in principle. Analyzing backscratching in terms of sensory reinforcement maybe an example. Here, when we claim that the back scratch is due to response-produced stimuli we are engaging in interpretation, and in the future we may or may not find the interpretation to have provided a complete account. We may ultimately find ways to block the suggested sensory stimulation and to discern the effects of this manipulation.
Finally, there are times when direct control is impossible in principle. A claim that we have unconscious thoughts and that these produce stimuli might be an example. Here, we are using the term "response-produced stimuli" solely to provide a consistent account, but at a considerable cost. We have disguised an analysis that cannot in principle meet all the goals of science from a behavior-analytic viewpoint in the cloak of terminology that suggests these goals can be met.
Behaviors as self-reinforcers. Even radical behaviorists sometimes claim that one behavior can be maintained by the person involved providing other behaviors as "self-reinforcers" (e.g., Malott, in press). The task ofbehavior analysis must be to explain both behaviors and their relation. When the contexts giving rise to such behavior-behavior relations have been manipulated experimentally, however (e.g., Hayes, Rosenfarb, Wulfert, Korn, & Zettle, 1985) , the apparent influence ofself-reinforcing behaviors have always resolved into the effects of environmental events (Sohn & Lamal, 1982) .
An example of an apparently causal behavioral consequence is the Premack principle. Superficially, this principle seems to suggest that one behavior can reinforce another in the same organism. But if the external environment manipulates the opportunity to engage in a particular behavior following another, then this is not a simple behavior-behavior relation. It is really best thought of as a behavior-environmental restrictionbehavior relation.
The examples of self-rules, responseproduced stimuli, and self-reinforcement show that behavior analysts are also susceptible to the tendency to dress up behavior-behavior relations in the cloak of nonbehavioral events and then to forget that they have done so. The cost of this action is the same as the cost of mentalistic talk or pseudophysiological talkincomplete analyses are inappropriately accepted as complete and a resultant gap in knowledge is produced. CONCLUSION An embrace of mentalism is not a sure road to an appreciation of the richness ofprivate phenomena, and trivialization is not the necessary result of behavioral translation. Behavior analysts should reject mentalistic terms precisely in order to study the actual phenomena associated with them in a more thorough way and in a way more satisfying to the goals of science as viewed by behavior analysts. Allowing behavioral causes made seemingly less incomplete by calling them "mental" ultimately tends to stop causal analysis before the point at which effective action is possible. We need to understand the actual phenomena pointed to by mentalistic terms, or terms such as self-rules or self-reinforcement for that matter. The analytic discipline supplied by the assumptions inherent in radical behaviorism is needed most in exactly such difficult endeavors, not in order to pursue analytic discipline for its own sake, but in order to develop a more thoroughly adequate explanation of human behavior.
